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More openness
on risks and on individual surgeons'
performance
Papers
pp 1697, 1701, 1705
Education and debate
pp 1734, 1736, 1740
Personal view
p 1756
Medicine and the media
p 1757
Cardiac surgery has changed within living memory
from desperate attempts to achieve miracles for a few to the present
situation where there is high expectation of a good result for tens of
thousands of patients each year. It is easy to recall the surgeons who
performed the first heart operations, who used cardiopulmonary bypass
while it was still in its infancy, or who started transplantation Some of that determination, in the face of possible failure, is
necessary in every surgeon. But the congenital heart surgery undertaken
in Bristol in the past 10 years Irrespective of the long awaited conclusions of the GMC in the Bristol
case, it was already abundantly clear that British cardiac surgeons,
themselves well in advance of other surgical specialties in keeping a
record of their results, would have to be audited in a more explicit
way. The United Kingdom Cardiac Surgery Register, to which cardiac
surgeons voluntarily submit their annual figures, has been run by the
Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland since
1977.5 It has provided a useful benchmark against which to
discuss variations in the provision of services and for individual
surgeons to monitor their own mortality figures against a national
average. At the time it was set up, and until recently The first steps in changing that have already been undertaken. All
cardiac and thoracic surgeons will now have to submit for inspection
their individual figures in specified areas of practice. These will be
coded, but any unsatisfactory results can be easily traced back to the
surgeon and poor performance investigated. Before long central
recording of full data on all cases, with appropriate risk
stratification, is likely to be the norm. The anonymity offered by
coding is notional and may be the last vestige of a belief in
confidentiality for surgical results that for years was held to be
sacrosanct.
The arterial switch operation for transposition of the great arteries,
central to the Bristol case, has presented a particular dilemma for
surgeons in balancing risk and benefit. "The switch" replaced well
established operations (those devised by Senning in 1959 and Mustard in
1963) which provided very effective palliation by redirecting the blood
flow in the atria, so that the physiology was corrected. The ventricles
continued to do each other's work but only for as long as the right
ventricle could withstand the systemic load. During the 1980s more and
more surgeons turned to the technically exacting, but in the long term
more satisfactory, arterial switch operation, with the objective of
restoring normal expectation of life and function, rather than
providing palliation of uncertain duration. The transition entailed the
possibility of an increase in operative mortality for this condition
during the "learning curve." The operation became the standard of
care, but precise preoperative assessment, impeccable surgical
technique, and skilled perioperative care are needed for consistently
good results. An analysis of a cluster of deaths for this operation in
an otherwise excellent series at Great Ormond Street is an exemplar of
honest self appraisal.8 Well in advance of the conclusions
reached by the GMC in the Bristol case, a meticulous national registry
for this operation has been established. We already know that for all
23 surgeons performing the operation (in 15 units) the mortality in
just over 200 operations performed within the past two years is 6.5%
(DeLeval M, British Cardiac Society meeting, May 1998).
A major issue in the Bristol case has been the nature of the
information given to the parents. The estimates of risk of death were
substantially less than the true risk of surgery in that unit. There
may be a place for giving an optimistic outlook to a patient judged to
have no choice but to undergo high risk emergency surgery to save life,
but the circumstances where that approach is justified are limited.
There was no justification for a rosy glow in this case, where the
operations were elective, could be performed elsewhere, and the
difference between success and failure was potentially many years of
life. It appears to be self evident that parents have a right to know
the truth from both referring cardiologist and the
surgeon.9 Why are doctors ever economical with it? Is
truth thought to contaminate the trust in a relationship? A frank
presentation of the risks and benefits to the family should include
sympathy and compassion, but this should not supplant frankness.
The hearings and deliberations at the GMC into the Bristol
paediatric surgery case have stretched over many months and explored
complex issues. It is often the case with a disaster (and this has been
a disaster not only for these families but for many others who work in
and around heart surgery) that there is no one isolated gross and
culpable error. Instead a sequence of more minor faults, errors,
omissions, poor procedures, failure to follow protocol, and unheard
warnings together lead to the eventual tragedy. In this case the
unheard warnings are particularly worrying. In 1989 Professor David
Hamilton's paediatric cardiac surgery working party, exploring the
provision of supraregional services, included data which might have
raised questions about Bristol's continuation as a centre for
paediatric cardiac surgery. Quite separately, a consultant anaesthetist
in Bristol "blew the whistle" but was disregarded (p
1739).10 The UK register, to which Bristol contributed
data, was available for comparison throughout this time. We have to ask
why these warnings, and the questions and doubts that clearly must have
surrounded the practice of paediatric cardiac surgery in Bristol for
several years, were not heard.
It has now been agreed that the Royal College of Surgeons of England
and the Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons will provide a "rapid
response group" so that a member of the council of the college and a
senior cardiac surgeon can be on site within 48 hours, to listen and
advise on action. This is an attempt by the profession to protect
patients from continuing poor performance St George's Hospital, London SW17 0QT
all
undertaken with a high initial mortality. They worked on doggedly, in
the face of doubt, scepticism, and often widely publicised criticism.
They are now remembered with respect as having had "the courage to
fail." Many others, equally determined, did fail and are not
remembered.1
the subject of the General Medical
Council's most recent, and arguably most important, disciplinary case
(p 1691, 1740)
2 3
was within the realms of routine
practice, for which there are known and well established standards. In
heart surgery accountability supplemented doggedness a long time ago.
The present arrangements, however
which rely on local monitoring of
results, clinician based judgments about acceptable standards, and
continuing referrals
failed to avert the situation in Bristol, which
we have seen spelt out in distressing detail before the General Medical
Council and the nation's media (p 1757).4
when there have
been two high profile cases of unacceptable mortality for cardiac
surgery
6 7
there was a tacit assumption that the
patients and surgeons in the dataset were anonymous and would remain
so. Furthermore, the use of that benchmark to assess one's own
practice was a matter of honour and personal reflection.
and also to safeguard
surgeons from inappropriate fault finding (since cardiac surgeons now
feel very much under scrutiny and vulnerable in a climate of criticism
and blame). It remains to be seen whether this initiative by the
college and the surgeons' own society can be implemented effectively
and whether it will be seen to be open enough to allay anxieties about
the profession supposedly monitoring itself, but not doing it well
enough. If we do not monitor ourselves effectively there is little
doubt that it will be imposed upon us.11
© BMJ 1998
What can you learn from this BMJ paper? Read Leanne Tite's Paper+