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Alain C Enthoven Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA
94305-5015, USA
enthoven_alain{at}gsb.stanford.edu
The NHS has just received its largest sustained increase in
resources since the service was started in 1948. To ensure that the
money is spent wisely, Britain's prime minister has set about producing a national plan for health, with the help of six action teams The prime minister was right to promise more money for the
NHS. I recently wrote: "The NHS is obviously very short of resources needed to achieve its objectives. One sees it in the buildings, the
pay, the staff and equipment shortages, the very short times doctors
spend with patients, and the headlines about crises."1
The prime minister was also right to say "that the NHS needs
fundamental reform if it is to provide the standard of care that people
deserve in the 21st century."2 Money alone will not get
us there.
And the prime minister was right to call attention to the wide
variations in performance in the NHS. Among his many examples: "Why
is there a twofold difference in the cost of care between the best and
the least efficient hospitals? . . . The top 25 per cent of trusts use their consultants twice as productively as the
bottom 25 per cent." These variations mean that large amounts of
resources are being wasted. That is, opportunities to get a great deal
more care out of the existing or expanded resources are being lost
because inefficient practices are unchecked. Open, competitive markets
work to drive out such variations as competition forces the least
efficient to adopt the methods of the more efficient, or be forced out
of business. What will do that in the NHS?
What is fundamental reform? Apparently the prime minister does
not have a plan. He has appointed six action teams to produce one by
July. What is missing from the speeches and the press releases is a
coherent strategy for effectively identifying and motivating systematic
improvement. Here are some suggestions.
The fundamental problems of the NHS cannot be fixed in time
to make a noticeable difference by the next election. It will take
years to change NHS culture, train and retrain the
people, create the necessary information systems, analyse and change
the care management processes, repair and build the needed buildings, and procure modern reliable equipment. Though there is a political imperative to find quick fixes, they will inevitably fail. Resources should be directed to reforms that can sustain large improvements over
the long run.
The government must give top priority to creating high quality
clinical and management information systems that measure the quality
and economy of all NHS operations. The NHS today lacks high quality
clinical and financial databases and makes poor use of the information
it has. Last year, Black wrote, "Irrespective of the uses to which
they wish to put the data, clinicians, managers, consumers, and
researchers all need data from consecutive cases, that are complete and
accurate, that are based on standard definitions of clinical disorders,
interventions, and outcomes, and that include information on those
characteristics of patients that affect
outcome."3
on prevention and inequalities, partnership, performance and
productivity, the professions and the wider NHS workforce, patient care
(empowerment), and patient care (speed of access). The BMJ
has asked six commentators to state what their priorities would be in
each of these areas, and we will be publishing these articles over the
next few weeks. This week, however, we start with a commentary from
Alain Enthoven, professor of public and private management at the
graduate business school, Stanford University. Enthoven's ideas were a
driving force behind the creation of the internal market in the NHS in
the 1990s; he recently revisited the subject in last year's Rock
Carling lecture, and we invited him to give his impressions on the
prime minister's current plans for the NHS.
Summary points
Quick fixes will fail: changing cultures and processes will take
time
Information is fundamental, and the NHS currently has poor information
and makes poor use of what it has
The government's centralising approach will fail: much better would be
to rely on incentives in a decentralised approach
Quality improvement is a sound philosophy that takes time and resources
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Quick fixes will fail
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Information is fundamental

(Credit: PHILIP WOLMUTH)
It was a serious mistake to leave information systems off the list of
challenges and modernisation action teams
unless information is seen
as an integral part of performance improvement or adequately addressed
by other initiatives. Good data are needed to measure and evaluate
outcomes and efficiency, to plan improvements, and to measure progress.
Without vastly improved information, and people trained and motivated
to use it, nothing else will do much good.
Creating the necessary information systems will require some fundamental changes in organisation and payment. A crucial problem for information systems is motivating staff to report accurately, promptly, and completely. Some real "out of the box" thinking is needed here. For example, the new plan might propose that a substantial part of each hospital's revenue should be based on fixed payments for each completed case weighted by healthcare resource group (HRG), with payment to follow submission of a completed discharge abstract signed by the attending doctor to attest to its accuracy. Perhaps the same should be done for consultants. Such a payment system could add a much needed incentive for productivity, an issue about which the prime minister expressed concern.2 Such data must be audited for accuracy and completeness.
Not just a problem of technology
The creation of information systems is not merely an information
technology problem (though information technology can help a great
deal). Accurate information must be made an integral part of
everyone's work. Information must have consequences. It must not be
seen as a mere academic exercise. Information systems must be good
enough that management (including doctors making clinical management
decisions) will act on what these systems produce.
Data on costs
The NHS needs and does not yet have good information on
comparative costs in hospitals. As James Raftery recently pointed out,
The New NHS
1998 Reference Costs suffers from several
serious deficiencies, including that the costs accounted for in
the report cover only about 40% of total hospital costs, the costing
methods are not standardised, and data are reported at hospital, not
patient, level.4 In other industries, management considers
it essential to measure costs per unit of output with reasonable
accuracy. It may be harder in health care, but the NHS cannot achieve
efficiency without it
because without it, nobody knows who or what is efficient.
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Incentives are fundamental |
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This brings us to the fundamental strategic choice of how to translate information into action. The prime minister is clearly heading for a centralised approach: create league tables and set the Commission for Health Improvement to work pursuing and changing the poor performers. I doubt that prime ministerial exhortation of NHS doctors to adopt his latest ideas on how to practice medicine will be effective in the long run.
Experience teaches that the centralised approach will fail. It assumes that the centre knows best. Centralised economic management has failed everywhere it has been tried. The former Soviet Union and other centrally planned economies failed. The bureaucrats at the centre consider variation and innovation to be a threat and they resist it. Moreover, the centralised approach is likely to be seen as punitive and coercive. It disempowers people in the field. And it is likely to do little or nothing to motivate the best performers to improve. Large corporations decentralise into smaller operating units.
Decentralise!
The alternative is to rely on incentives in a decentralised
approach. For all its limitations, the internal market was the
beginning of a decentralised, incentives oriented approach. It was
wrong for the prime minister to make so much of abolishing it. It would
have made more sense to seek ways to make it work better. The
"abolition" conflicts with what is said in the government's
white paper The New NHS: "New primary care groups will be
established in all parts of the country to commission services for
local patients . . . devolved commissioning will go
hand in hand with greater equity." Commissioning by primary care
groups or trusts is an internal market-like idea that could be seen as
generalisation of general practitioner fundholding.
for lack of information or for partisan,
ideological, or other political reasons
and then forced on the whole
NHS. Better to let the local people evaluate the evidence in their own
context, while holding them accountable for quality and cost. The
decentralised approach recognises that a lot of important information
is local, may be qualitative, and not available to the
centre
especially today with such weak NHS information systems.
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Quality improvement |
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The answers to the present crisis of confidence in the quality of care in the NHS must be found in basic organisational and cultural changes that lead to much greater transparency and to a total commitment to continuous quality improvement (CQI). This seems to be what clinical governance is about. I had hoped the internal market would motivate and reward it. Continuous quality improvement is a comprehensive and integrated management philosophy that has been adopted with impressive success in some industrial companies.1 Government cannot force this from the top. Real continuous quality improvement is a "grass roots" movement. But government can state expectations that a profound change in NHS culture and method of operation must take place.5 And it can create a framework of appropriate incentives.
Yet the government must prioritise: it can't have continuous quality improvement and everything else it is demanding every week. It must provide resources to support the extensive training that will be needed. It was an excellent idea to include the quality improvement leader Donald Berwick of Harvard on the recently appointed performance and productivity team.6 He is leading the campaign to bring continuous quality improvement to American health care (which is definitely not an easy task).
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| (Credit: ULRIKE PREUSS) |
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Consumer choice and competition are modern |
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This government is committed to the objectives set out in Modernising Government, including modernising the NHS.7 The March 1999 white paper emphasised responsive public services focused on the needs of users, efficient high quality services, "information age" government using new technology, and valuing public service. It noted that "the British public has grown accustomed to consumer choice and competition in the private sector. If our public service is to survive and thrive, it must match the best in its ability to innovate, to share good ideas and to control costs." The government intends to modernise "wherever practical by giving the public the right to choose . . . The incentives to modernise have been weak." The author of that white paper should be included in the drafting of the new plan.
I doubt that it is possible to create and sustain a culture of
innovation, efficiency, and good customer service in a public sector
monopoly whose services are in excess demand and whose units do not get
more resources for caring for more patients. That is asking too much.
Money has to follow patients. I doubt that the NHS can achieve
modernity without consumer choice and competition, and substantially
more resources. The prime minister has promised additional resources.
Let us hope that his July plan includes some consumer choice and
competition and strong incentives to modernise.
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Footnotes |
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Competing interests: None declared.
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References |
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| 1. | Enthoven A. In pursuit of an improving National Health Service: the 1999 Rock Carling fellowship. London: Nuffield Trust, 1999. |
| 2. | Blair T. NHS modernisation. House of Commons official report (Hansard) 2000 March 22:cols 981-4. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/cm000322/debtext/00322-04.htm#00322-04_spmin0 (accessed 27 April 2000). |
| 3. | Black N. High quality clinical databases: breaking down barriers. Lancet 1999; 353: 1205[CrossRef][Medline]. |
| 4. | Raftery J. Benchmarking costs in health services. J Health Serv Res Policy 1999; 4: 63[Medline]. |
| 5. | Secretary of State for Health. A first class service: quality in the new NHS. London: Department of Health, 1998. |
| 6. | Department of Health. A national plan for a National Health Service. In: London: DoH, 2000. http://pipe.ccta.gov.uk/coi/coipress.nsf/70e1fa6684c1d3f380256735005750fb/5447b3ced258f7f1802568ac004002c9?OpenDocument (accessed 27 April 2000). |
| 7. | Cunningham J. Modernising government. London: Cabinet Office, 1999. |
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