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Existing laws in Britain offer a promising framework
In a bold new report, the tobacco advisory
group of the Royal College of Physicians of London has called for the
establishment of a nicotine regulatory authority in the United
Kingdom.1 Regulation of tobacco has not been a conspicuous
success at the level of the European Union so far. The reason, as the
report from the college points out, is that tobacco legislation at the European Union level has been preoccupied with the operation of a
single market rather than with the protection of public
health.1 Rather than wait for the European Union to get
its act together, the British government should act now to establish a
regulatory framework for tobacco and nicotine.
Of all the possible alternative ways of obtaining nicotine, smoking
cigarettes remains by far the most addictive. The reason is that
smoking cigarettes maximises the rapidity, frequency, reliability, and
ease of attainment of the reward from nicotine.2 Nicotine
via cigarettes reaches the brain in 10 seconds, which is faster than
via intravenous use. Regular smokers of 20 cigarettes per day reinforce
their habit with an average of 200 rewards per day. It is much easier
and cheaper to purchase a pack of cigarettes (for example, from petrol
stations or local supermarkets) than it is to purchase a packet of
nicotine gum. Unfortunately, cigarettes are the deadliest form of
nicotine delivery available on the market. It is not the nicotine per
se but the combustion and release of over 40 carcinogens as well as
other toxic chemicals that are responsible for the bulk of premature
illnesses and deaths that result when cigarettes are used as intended.
The report is not the first to have noticed the perverse twist on the
inverse care law in the regulatory status quo for nicotine products.3 Currently the most toxic form of nicotine
delivery is the least regulated, whereas all innovations from
pharmaceutical companies (such as nicotine gum and inhalers) are
subject to a lengthy and expensive approval process for their
marketing, which is overseen by government regulators. The regulatory
playing field is tilted distinctly in favour of the cigarette
manufacturers. In theory, a cigarette manufacturer who wishes to
introduce a perfumed cigarette to mask the smell of tobacco smoke can
do so without regulatory obstacles. On the other hand, if a
pharmaceutical company wants to add mint flavouring to nicotine gum to
make it more palatable, it must endure years of regulatory
hurdles.3
It is not a coincidence that cigarettes have so far managed to escape
regulation. Soon after taking office, the former United States Surgeon
General Everett Koop discovered that tobacco "is considered neither a
food nor a drug nor a cosmetic; therefore it is a unique substance,
virtually outside regulatory control."4 The reason for
the cigarette's unique legal status, at least in the United States, is
that Congress made sure to insert a clause that specifically excluded
tobacco from virtually every major law passed to protect consumers,
including the Controlled Substances Act 1970, the Consumer Product
Safety Act 1972, and the Toxic Substances Control Act
1976.5 This lamentable record culminated in the supreme
court ruling two years ago that the Food and Drug Administration lacked
the authority to regulate tobacco.
By contrast, the report from the royal college has identified several
existing pieces of legislation in the United Kingdom that do not seem
to exclude tobacco, including the Consumer Protection Act 1987, the
Medicines Act 1968, and the Food Safety Act 1990. These laws offer a
promising framework for the regulation of nicotine, including tobacco products.
The urgent need for levelling the playing field in nicotine regulation
is underscored by the proliferation of new tobacco products on the
market. In the absence of any regulation, cigarette manufacturers have
introduced a veritable bazaar of new products This is not to deny that genuine reduction of harm might be achievable
some day through technological advances. Economic logic means that such
technological innovations might be encouraged and sped up by levelling
the competitive playing field for products containing
nicotine.3 An independent nicotine regulatory authority with jurisdiction over both new tobacco products and other nicotine delivery products would serve the interests of both fair competition and the protection of public health.
Department of Health and Social Behavior, Harvard School of
Public Health, 677 Huntington Avenue, Boston MA 02115, USA, (Ichiro.Kawachi{at}channing.harvard.edu)
for example, R J
Reynolds's "Eclipse" and Philip Morris's "Accord" (examples of
so called smokeless cigarettes), as well as Brown and Williamson's
"Advance" and Vector Tobacco's "Omni" (examples of "low
carcinogen" cigarettes). New cigarette products are often implicitly
marketed to smokers as "safer" alternatives to conventional cigarettes. No Cochrane reviews have yet been conducted to back any
claims of "safer" cigarettes. However, history warns us that whenever product modifications are introduced by cigarette
manufacturers they are usually nothing more than a marketing exercise
designed to deter smokers from quitting.6 For example, the
seemingly wide range of choice that consumers have in the "low
yield" cigarette market is an illusion based on machine yields of
nicotine and tar that bear little relation to the actual levels inhaled
by smokers.7
Footnotes
Competing interests: None declared.
| 1. | Royal College of Physicians of London Tobacco Advisory Group. Protecting smokers, saving lives: the case for a tobacco and nicotine regulatory authority. London: RCP, 2002. |
| 2. |
Hughes JR.
Why does smoking so often produce dependence? A somewhat different view.
Tobacco Control
2001;
10:
62-64 |
| 3. | Warner K, Slade J, Sweanor DT. The emerging market for long-term nicotine maintenance. JAMA 1997; 278: 1087-1092[Abstract]. |
| 4. | Koop CE. Koop. New York: Random House, 1991. |
| 5. | Emmons KM, Kawachi I, Barclay G. Tobacco control: A brief review of history and prospects for the future. Hematol Oncol Clin North Am 1997; 2: 177-195. |
| 6. | Parker-Pope T. Cigarettes. Anatomy of an industry from seed to smoke. New York: New Press, 2001. |
| 7. |
Ueda K, Kawachi I, Nakamura M, Nogami H, Shirokawa N, Masui S, et al.
Cigarette nicotine yields and nicotine intake among Japanese male workers.
Tobacco Control
2002;
11:
55-60 |
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